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COMPETITION AND COMITY
IN THE FRAGMENTATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
William Thomas Worster*
INTRODUCTION
The international legal system encompasses a variety of legal norms,
but the perceived increase in “fragmentation” of these norms has recently
been seen as a problem for the system as a whole.1 A few notable cases
have highlighted the difficulties of a variety of tribunals reaching contradictory results. One example is the direct conflict between the decision of
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the Nicaragua case2 and the
decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in the Tadić case.3 In Tadić, the ICTY took the position
that the “effective control” test, as formulated by the ICJ for determining
whether a foreign State is responsible for an internal civil war, was too
demanding.4 Instead, the ICTY held that the foreign State need only have
had “a role in organizing, coordinating, or planning the military actions
of the military group.”5 Interestingly, the ICTY did not suggest that this
test is lex specialis for international individual criminal responsibility,
but, rather, that the ICJ’s “effective control” test should be displaced
entirely.6
This conflict between the ICJ and the ICTY is hardly isolated.7 There
is a perception that “courts in various countries are increasingly dissatis* Lecturer and Senior Fellow, International Law, Bynkershoek Institute, The Hague
University; LL.M. (Adv.) in Public International Law, Leiden University, Faculty of
Law, Leiden, The Netherlands; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Modern European History, University of Kansas,
Lawrence, Kansas.
1. For a commentator’s negative portrayal of “fragmentation,” see Gerhard Hafner,
Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L.
849, 849–50 (2004).
2. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nic. v. US), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 64–65, ¶ 115
(June 27).
3. Prosec. v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 116–45 (July 15, 1999).
4. Id.
5. Id. ¶ 137, at 59.
6. Id.
7. For example, the MOX Plant litigation comprises of a number of cases brought by
Ireland against the United Kingdom regarding a nuclear reprocessing plant; these cases
were litigated in several different fora and, notably, involved a conflict of jurisdiction.
See, e.g., MOX Plant (No. 10) (Ir. v. U.K.), 41 I.L.M. 405 (Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001);
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fied with traditional rules [for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction and
norms, considering them to be] inadequate in a modern, globalizing
world.”8 Consequently, many writers have suggested forms of increased
comity among international tribunals in order to combat the problems
associated with fragmentation; indeed, locating harmonies among international legal regimes within a coherent international legal system appears to be the dominant trend.9 The proposals of Joost Pauwelyn10 and
Yuval Shany,11 as well as to some degree the work of the International
Law Commission (“ILC”) on fragmentation,12 are characteristic of the
comity solution. Yet these perspectives dismiss, or at the very least,
largely overlook, the benefits of competition among international tribunals. The international legal system need not identically reproduce a
MOX Plant (No. 3) (Ir. v. U.K.), 42 I.L.M. 1187 (Perm. Ct. Arb., 2003) [hereinafter PCA
Mox Plant Case No. 3]; Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Art. 9 of the
OSPAR Convention (Final Award) (Ir. v. U.K.), 42 I.L.M. 118 (Perm. Ct. Arb., 2003).
See also Nikolaos Lavranos, The Mox Plant and Ijzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court is
the Supreme Arbiter?, 19 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 223 (2006) (discussing the need for a
hierarchy amongst international courts and tribunals in order to avoid the fragmentation
of international law).
8. Jay L. Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiation, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 567, 586
(2003). See also Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 573, 574–75 (2005) (arguing that fragmentation is caused by treaty conflicts and
that a new approach should be established to resolve these conflicts).
9. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization:
The Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 216 (2005) (“The most promising approach is to establish a set of common principles meant to harmonize the procedural
means by which national courts adjudicate grave human rights violations.”).
10. See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) [hereinafter
PAUWELYN, CONFLICT]; Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 903 (2004) [hereinafter Pauwelyn, Bridging]; Joost Pauwelyn, Going Global, Regional, or Both?: Dispute
Settlement in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Overlaps with
the WTO and Other Jurisdictions, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TR. 231 (2004) [hereinafter
Pauwelyn, Going Global].
11. See YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS (2002); Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts Between ICSID Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
835 (2005).
12. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Study Group, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International
Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter ILC, July 18 Rep.]; Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Study Group, Fragmentation
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter ILC, Apr. 13 Rep.].
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domestic legal system, even if it were possible to do so. If we accept contradictions and disparities in different tribunals’ conclusions as inherent
in and perhaps even beneficial to international law, then conflicts related
to fragmentation are not so objectionable. Competition among tribunals
can itself serve as the coherence of the international legal system, albeit
not in the unitary, constitutional form of harmonized norms that some
may desire.
The argument that international tribunals should consider embracing
competition among themselves proceeds in three stages. Part I discusses
comity as a solution to conflicts emerging from fragmentation, in particular, the work of Joost Pauwelyn, Yuval Shany, and the ILC. Part II
observes the reality of competition among tribunals, specifically discussing the viewpoints of Anne-Marie Slaughter, Yves Dezalay, and Bryant
Garth. Part III assesses the drawbacks and benefits of competition, concluding that competition among tribunals can result in constructive
diversity, rather than destructive fragmentation. International justice can
be realized best not by developing new forms of comity or attempting to
politically replace one regime with another, but, rather, by accepting the
diversity of norms and tribunals in the system and allowing them to be
subject to a kind of natural selection.
I. COMITY AS A SOLUTION
In weighing the benefits of increased comity and competition, the first
inquiry is: what is meant by “comity”? As one scholar has noted,
“[D]espite ubiquitous invocation of the doctrine of comity, its meaning is
surprisingly elusive.”13 Comity can mean anything from the foundation
of international law to mere courtesy, from rules of jurisdiction to the
discretion to decline a case.14
An example of comity serving as a rule of respect for the sovereignty
and competence of another legal actor can be found in the MOX Plant
cases.15 In these cases, the tribunal formed under the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea suspended its proceedings to provide the European
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) an opportunity to reach a decision on a pending
application concerning issues similar to those the tribunal was confronting. The tribunal reasoned that that ECJ might be better suited to answer
the questions at hand.16 There was no immediate threat of reaching a conflicting decision, just an initial conflict of jurisdiction. The tribunal
13.
14.
15.
16.

Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1991).
See generally id., at 44–54, 70–77.
PCA Mox Plant Case No. 3, supra note 7, ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 29.
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explained that the stay was required by the “mutual respect and comity
that should [exist] between judicial institutions” deciding on rights and
obligations as between States, and entrusted with the function of assisting States in the peaceful settlement of disputes between them.17
A distinction can be made between a deferral under comity out of
respect for another judicial body and a deferral under comity out of respect for a State generally.18 Some legal systems, however, have denied
that comity is practiced out of international respect for another sovereign,
instead explaining that it arises from a demand for substantive justice,19
which may encompass the principles of diplomatic or sovereign immunity,20 or the recognition of foreign court judgments.21 For the purposes of
this Article, the important distinction is whether the discretion exercised
is one of legal principle or courtesy.
Comity is known in both common law and civil law countries.22 In
general, common law systems practice comity as discretion,23 whereas
civil law systems are inclined to refute that comity is discretionary,
arguing that exercising discretion would be an abuse of judicial power.24
While civil law courts may reach similar results as their common law
counterparts, they do so under legally binding principles, rather than by
mere courtesy.25 These principles of comity in civil law countries generally tend to be seen as principles of binding public international law,26 a
notion common law countries generally reject.27 Common law countries,
however, have historically maintained that the distinction between public
and private comity is false.28 Hersch Lauterpacht, for example, has de17. Id. ¶ 28.
18. See Upendra Baxi, Geographies of Injustice, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
197, 205 (Scott Craig ed., 2001).
19. See Paul, supra note 13, at 44–54.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 2 (citing MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 250
(1988)).
22. See id. at 44–54.
23. See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281 (1982).
24. See Paul, supra note 13, at 33. See also Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005
E.C.R. I-1383 (criticizing the forum non conveniens principle as incompatible with European regulation).
25. See Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003
(2006); Paul, supra note 13, at 32.
26. See Paul, supra note 13, at 28.
27. See Maier, supra note 23.
28. See Paul, supra note 9, at 25–26 (discussing how leading European scholars in the
nineteenth century did not see a distinction between the private and the public and “ar-
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nied comity to be a binding principle of public international law, and instead argued it to be a matter of respect among sovereigns.29
Thus, it is clear that there is no simple definition for comity and that
because of these differences between legal cultures, the criteria for invoking comity vary widely among national jurisdictions. Some believe a
tribunal must examine the interests of the forum while keeping in mind
its role as a facilitator of interfora questions and resolver of conflicts
within the international legal system.30 Others criticize considering interstate political relations and demand that a tribunal simply apply its law
without regard to these issues.31
Despite the difficulty of defining comity, it appears to be a way for injecting international politics directly into a tribunal’s considerations that
is separate from the “mechanical” act of legal interpretation.32 Given the
flexible and broad notion of comity, it might best be described “[a]s a
bridge . . . meant to expand the role of public policy, public law, and international politics in [the judiciary].”33 The results of applying comity or
quasi-comity principles of law can be similar, notwithstanding various
interpretations; a court uses these principles to defer to another sovereign
regarding certain issues, but not others, based on a balance struck between competing policies.34 As a result, any use or advocacy of comity
must be an assertion of some extralegal policy choices.

gued in varying degrees that private international law derived from public international
law,” but noting that in the United States, a private/public distinction did exist.)
29. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 43–46 (E. Lauterpacht ed.,
1970); Hersch Lauterpacht, Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection and Jurisdiction Over
Aliens, 9 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 330, 331 (1945).
30. See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 429, 478 n.193 (2003); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution:
Proliferation, Fragmentation and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in International
Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 273 (2006). See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the U.N. Dispute
Settlement System?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 753, 774–79 (1999) (“In international
economic law, ‘cooperation among international courts’ has been recognized as an important tool for promoting an international ‘community of law.’”).
31. See Maier, supra note 23, at 288.
32. See Paul, supra note 13, at 54–56.
33. Id. at 7.
34. See id. at 2 (“Comity is a ready explanation for much of what courts do in public
and private international law. In the name of comity, U.S. courts often recognize and
enforce foreign judgments or limit domestic jurisdiction to hear claims or apply law, even
where foreign law is contrary to U.S. law or policy. Guided by notions of comity, courts
consider competing foreign and domestic interests.”).
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Regardless of its nature, comity is often conceived as part of a coherent
field of international law.35 One’s perspective on the nature of the international legal system informs not only how comity is applied, but also
how it is best applied. If one sees the international legal system as a coherent whole (or a system with the objective of forming a coherent
whole), then one’s policy choice is to place emphasis on the integrity of
the system. After all, comity is a way for one legal actor to defer to
another.36 However, if one does not see a coherent whole, but rather,
independent, competing legal actors, a system “mostly of erratic blocks
and elements as well as different partial systems,”37 what kind of comity
should be exercised?
A. Joost Pauwelyn’s View
Joost Pauwelyn has made an effort to bring together public international legal rules while still recognizing the differences among nations and
their respective freedom to refuse to defer to others’ rules. He draws
general conclusions for international tribunals from the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). Finding that the WTO must contemplate the entire
corpus of international law,38 he creates the metaphor of “inter-connected
islands”: legal orders, of which the WTO is one, that are self-contained
to some degree, but also regard each other through their connections in
general international law.39 With this expression, he describes a fairly
coherent international legal system respected by tribunals, regardless of
their specialty; although they may conflict over jurisdiction, they do not
seek to impose differing legal norms.40
Pauwelyn defines conflict more broadly than two situations demanding
two distinct outcomes. For him, certainly, the notion of a conflict
includes situations in which one outcome demands a violation of the

35. But see id. at 8–9 (“[T]he peculiar strain [of comity] that developed in the classical doctrine of comity in the United States resulted in part from the incoherence of the
doctrine itself. This incoherence is both traceable to, and well represented by, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hilton v. Guyot, which is the most commonly cited statement of
comity in U.S. law.”).
36. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 579.
37. Hafner, supra note 1, at 850. See also William Burke-White, International Legal
Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963, 964 (2004) (discussing the fragmented nature of international law discourse).
38. PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 440 (“The thrust of [this] book [is] to
portray WTO law as part of the wider corpus of public international law.”).
39. See Pauwelyn, Bridging, supra note 10.
40. See id.
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other,41 but his definition also includes situations involving a conflict
between an obligation and a right,42 which is not a particularly narrow
reading of the meaning of conflict. He also finds it important to distinguish between a direct, facial conflict of norms and a conflict of norms
that arises only from the interpretive and implementation process.43
Having identified the kinds of conflicts he will address, Pauwelyn then
proposes rules for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction and norms by referring to already existing rules of public international law. For example, he
looks to explicit conflicts clauses, lex posterior and lex specialis rules,
and the laws on state responsibility.44 In other work, he discusses forum
non conveniens, res judicata, abuse of process, and lis alibi pendens45 as
additional existing methods in international law to resolve conflicts of
jurisdiction. Some conflicts result in the invalidity of one of the norms;
others result in the priority of one norm over the other.46 A tribunal may
only find a true conflict if the usual methods of international law for
dealing with conflicts fail.
One argument against such an approach—namely, using the WTO as a
guideline for other tribunals—is that the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) specifically accepts general international law as an
interpretive tool,47 whereas other bodies may not. In particular, ad hoc
arbitral tribunals, or national courts hearing disputes with an international
character, do not necessarily accept the entire corpus of general international law.48 Although one could argue that the DSU’s endorsement of
41. PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 175–76 (“Essentially, two norms are,
therefore, in a relationship of conflict if one constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a
breach of the other.”).
42. Id. at 171–72, 178–88.
43. Id. at 176.
44. Id. at 327–43.
45. See Pauwelyn, Going Global, supra note 10.
46. PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 178–88.
47. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33
I.L.M. 1125, art. 3 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]; Appellate Body Report, U.S.— Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Mar. 20, 1996)
(holding that the DSU Article 3.2 requires WTO agreements to be interpreted in accordance “with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”).
48. For a discussion on ad hoc tribunals, see, for example, ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN
HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 127 (4th ed.,
2004). “The reference to ‘such rules of international law as may be applicable’ (as, for
example, in the Washington Convention), or to ‘the relevant principles of international
law’ (as in the Channel Tunnel Treaty) [helps] remind us that it is not the whole corpus
of law, but only certain specific rules of law that are likely to be relevant in any given
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general international law as an interpretive guideline49 suggests that the
rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) would not apply without it, the contrary argument could also
be made: the DSU codifies what should have been understood before its
formation. In fact, the WTO Panel in Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement stated that the purpose of the DSU provision was
to resolve the issues stemming from the pre-WTO era when adjudicators
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) failed to
follow the customary rules of treaty interpretation properly.50
Moreover, the WTO’s acceptance of general international law is
phrased in terms of using the law to guide the interpretation of the WTO
Agreements, not to impose additional obligations independent from, or
superior to, the Agreements.51 It is clear from the terms of the DSU itself
that general international law is a valid interpretive tool, but the DSU
does not indicate that non-WTO obligations may be transported into the
WTO context.52 There is no support in the text of the WTO Agreements
for applying a non-WTO defense against a WTO obligation. If Pauwelyn
finds that such defenses may be entertained, there would appear to be no
similar prohibition against a WTO tribunal hearing the merits of a nonWTO claim as well. Furthermore, as Bruno Simma has observed, “[T]he
exclusion or modification through a ‘self-contained regime’ or ‘normal’
secondary rules which leads to a ‘softening’ of the legal consequences of
wrongful acts should not easily be presumed.”53 Accordingly, Pauwelyn’s conclusion that the WTO should be a model for international
tribunals generally may be unwarranted.
An additional critique of Pauwelyn’s perspective is that integrating
WTO law into substantive nontrade international law may go against the
intent of the parties to the WTO and may be counterproductive to achieving the human rights and environmental objectives that Pauwelyn
appears to endorse. The parties to the WTO presumably negotiated the
Agreements with the intent of establishing a self-contained regime,
allowing the terms of the Agreements to be interpreted in the light of
dispute.” Id. For a discussion on national courts, see, for example, Medellin v. Texas, 128
S.Ct. 1346, 1361–62 (2008) (holding that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
though it was adopted as a treaty, was not incorporated into U.S. law by implementing
legislation, which would provide a mechanism for direct enforcement).
49. See DSU, supra note 47, art. 3.2, at 1227.
50. Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, ¶ 7.96,
WT/DS163/R (May 1, 2000).
51. DSU, supra note 47, art. 3.2, at 1227.
52. Id. art. 1(1), at 1227.
53. Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 16 NETHERLANDS Y.B. OF INT’L L. 111,
135 (1985).
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general international law, while refusing to grant competence to hear
non-WTO law matters, as defenses or otherwise.54 The political tradeoffs of such negotiation should not be dismissed lightly: “by establishing
‘self-contained regimes,’ States contract out of the general rules on the
consequences of treaty violations on the expectation that these regimes
will work to their mutual benefit.”55 The parties may have specifically
intended certain outcomes, either by limiting the competence of the organization or even by making the organization entirely ineffective.56 This
perspective does not imply that nontrade goals are irrelevant for the development of WTO law, since the negotiators of the WTO Agreements
could have intended trade liberalization as one vehicle for reducing poverty and otherwise improving global welfare57 (even though it might
impact the environment adversely). Moreover, Pauwelyn’s proposal risks
undermining the WTO regime. If decisions are based on agreements
outside the WTO’s specific competence, they may be less likely to be
complied with, as Member Parties may view those decisions as less legitimate and may bring their claims to the WTO less frequently.
One of the fundamental points Pauwelyn makes is the right to “contract out” of existing norms while still maintaining respect for international law already in force, even if a negotiated treaty does not.58 This
deference includes the obligation to apply pre-existing norms in a forum,
but within the limits of the tribunal’s competence. For example, the
WTO must apply other norms as defenses, although it is not competent
to enforce the norms themselves.59 A possible illustration of the WTO
applying this kind of rule might be Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann’s proposal
for the WTO to acknowledge its members’ human rights obligations.60

54. Francesco Francioni, WTO Law in Context: The Integration of International
Human Rights and Environmental Law in the Dispute Settlement Process, in THE WTO
AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 143–45 (Giorgio
Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006). See also
WORLD TRADE ORG. INFO. & MEDIA RELATIONS DIV., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO (3d ed.
2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf.
55. Simma, supra note 53, at 136.
56. See Martinez, supra note 30, at 469.
57. See generally, e.g., Sandra E. Black & Elizabeth Brainerd, Importing Equality?:
The Impact of Globalization on Gender Discrimination, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 540
(2004) (examining the impact of globalization on gender discrimination in manufacturing
industries).
58. PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 37–40, 212–18.
59. See id. at 228–36.
60. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade Law: Defining
and Connecting the Two Fields, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 29, 70 (L.
Burgi et al. eds., 2005).
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Interestingly, Pauwelyn’s conclusion is that, in a conflict, many international legal norms may result in the nonapplication of WTO law.61
Essentially, he believes that since all international legal norms apply (unless contracted out), there really is no conflict.62 The difficulty with this
argument is that, while States may “contract out,” it is not entirely clear
that the WTO Agreements establishing the rules of trade liberalization
“contracted out” of the rules otherwise governing the interactions of
States. While it is assumed that the rules of general international law
apply before all tribunals unless specifically exempted from application,
just the opposite could be argued: the WTO is a tribunal whose competence is deliberately limited to the WTO Agreements.63
This argument is based on Pauwelyn’s interpretation of the WTO obligations as “reciprocal,” rather than “integral,” as might be expected in a
multilateral treaty.64 In contrast, though, Pauwelyn interprets other international obligations as truly “integral” and thus owed erga omnes.65
Conveniently, “reciprocal” obligations may be modified between the
parties, regardless of other multilateral partners’ opinions, whereas
“integral” obligations may not.66 The happy result is that “integral” treaties concluded before the WTO Agreements, such as some human rights
treaties, remain in force and are not modified by the WTO Agreements.
However, “integral” treaties concluded after the WTO Agreements can
modify those obligations. This is problematic because although the WTO
tribunals may issue decisions aimed at the withdrawal of the offending
provisions, they do not have the authority to order their withdrawal; instead, compensation may be awarded if a State chooses to continue main-

61. PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 490–92. See also Pauwelyn, Bridging,
supra note 10, at 911.
62. Pauwelyn, Bridging, supra note 10, at 915–16 (“Especially before a particular
court or tribunal, it is important to include all international law binding between the parties as part of the applicable law, even if the jurisdiction of the adjudicator is limited to a
given treaty (say, WTO covered agreements). If all courts and tribunals follow this approach, it would mean that, although they may have jurisdiction to examine different
claims, in doing so they would apply the same law. Hence, in theory, no conflicts should
arise.”).
63. See, e.g., European Communities—Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain
Poultry Products, ¶ 79, WT/DS69/AB/R (July 13, 1998) (adopted July 23, 1998) (holding that a separate bilateral agreement between the parties was not a WTO agreement
within the WTO’s competence).
64. See PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 69–88. For an overview of the distinction between “reciprocal” and “integral,” see id. at 52–88.
65. See, e.g., id. at 74–75 (characterizing the Genocide Convention and European
Communities’ treaties as “integral”).
66. See id. at 53.

2008]

COMPETITION AND COMITY

129

taining those measures.67 Such possibility demonstrates that States have
some freedom to violate the WTO Agreements, albeit in violation of a
moral obligation to comply.68 This interpretation is also troublesome because conflicts between tribunals’ jurisdiction and jurisprudence might
be subject to a classification of the conflict, regardless of whether the
obligation in question is “integral” or “reciprocal,” or whether it is a prohibition or a right. Although Pauwelyn observes that the interpretation of
treaties evolves,69 he does not acknowledge that the classification of
norms might similarly evolve.
An even larger problem with Pauwelyn’s view is his assumption that
existing rules of public international law (which provide options for
managing conflicts) apply to certain kinds of conflicts. As previously
discussed, even this concept is plagued with a variety of interpretations.
In cases of “inherent normative conflicts,”70 there may not be agreement
on the normative force of explicit conflicts clauses, and on lex posterior
and specialis rules, among other conflict resolution techniques.
Curiously, Pauwelyn also acknowledges the general benefit of decentralized competition, noting that “multiple proceedings may actually be
helpful as long as each tribunal stays within the limits of its jurisdiction
and defers to the other tribunal when it comes to deciding matters falling
within that tribunal’s jurisdiction,”71 as “different conclusions based on
the same law . . . may even have positive side effects: [t]hrough competition the best interpretation is likely to surface.”72 However, his general
approach is not one of true competition among tribunals, but of promoting a constitutionalizing process.
In sum, Pauwelyn’s version of comity appears to be a legal one in the
civil law tradition, not an overtly discretionary pursuit of policy objectives. In reality, however, Pauwelyn is advocating for the primacy of
human rights obligations over WTO law as a political end in itself, not as
the result of the objective application of rules of interpretation. He proposes a rather radical restructuring of the relationships among international tribunals, as well as a radical restructuring of their competence,

67. DSU, supra note 47, art. 22(2), at 1239.
68. This moral obligation is articulated in the Vienna Convention, which notes that
under pacta sunt servanda “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
69. Pauwelyn, Bridging, supra note 10, at 907.
70. Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Joyce L. Tong, The Continuing Debate Over New Sources
of International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1349, 1372 (2004).
71. Pauwelyn, Going Global, supra note 10, at 295.
72. Pauwelyn, Bridging, supra note 10, at 916.
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although he relies on existing rules of international law, selecting certain
legal objectives such as effectiveness, and techniques such as lex posterior. By selecting objectives and techniques that do not appear to reflect
policy choices, he brings extra-WTO issues into the fold and constitutionalizes the WTO within the international legal system.
B. Yuval Shany’s View
Yuval Shany also recommends a form of comity to increase the effectiveness of international dispute settlement.73 He suggests mechanisms
for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction, not conflicts of obligations. These
mechanisms include increased comity (i.e., the conservative exercise of
jurisdiction based on respect) and the harmonization of conflict rules.74
Whereas Pauwelyn offers pre-existing rules of public international law to
resolve normative conflicts, Shany transports private international law’s
jurisdictional conflict rules into the sphere of public international law.
These jurisdictional conflict rules embrace concepts such as forum non
conveniens, res judicata, and lis alibi pendens.75 In later work, Shany also
proposes abus de droit to prevent parties from taking advantage of alternate fora in bad faith, by forum shopping or otherwise.76 Although Shany
acknowledges that various legal actors are independent of one another,
he, like Pauwelyn, views international law as a coherent system whose
dangerous conflicts need only be “solved” by clear rules.
One problem with Shany’s analysis is that aspects of comity, especially the concepts of forum non conveniens and bad faith, are highly discretionary.77 Thus, they are a rather unpredictable tool for constructing an
international legal system that is supposed to be able to resolve conflicts
predictably. Shany identifies where consistent practice can be found for
discretionary policy, such as with lis alibi pendens and res judicata, but
also notes where it cannot.78 Although he concedes that competition
among fora may develop better, more harmonious policies (just as Pauwelyn appears to do), his definition of competing fora is narrow. Shany
73. See generally SHANY, supra note 11.
74. Id. at 266, 271.
75. See id. at 269–70.
76. See Shany, supra note 11, at 849.
77. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law: Why
Competition Among International Economic Law Tribunals is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 241 (2007). See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1947) (“The
principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its
jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute. .
. . [T]he doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts.”).
78. SHANY, supra note 11, at 269–71.
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argues that tribunals are only in competition if they are likely to produce
similar results on the same issue.79 Yet, the “lis alibi pendens rule [and
the res judicata requirement] . . . [do] not apply to courts of different national, regional, and worldwide legal systems unless such a prohibition
has been explicitly provided.”80
Despite Shany’s examples, increasing the degree of discretion for tribunals is an unlikely political goal. For example, as José Alvarez has
observed:
At least some of the [North American Free Trade Agreement] parties
appear to be having second thoughts about the scope of discretion that
they have handed over to [International Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes] arbitrators and appear to be turning to interpretative statements ‘to take the power of decision away.’81

Judge Guillaume might add that in order to apply norms drawn from
national courts, including lis alibi pendens and res judicata, the international legal system might also need to adopt rules of court hierarchy, as
national court systems have done.82 Shany acknowledges that until more
harmonized rules are developed, his conflict resolution policies appear
very political. Many commentators have observed that tribunals are often
very conscious of the appearance that they create law.83 It seems strange
for Shany to propose the development of rules by tribunals for the sake
of legitimacy and effectiveness while worrying that the rules he proposes
might appear to have been politically developed.
In contrast to Pauwelyn, Shany’s version of comity is more discretionary and more overtly policy laden, but, like Pauwelyn, his proposal is
actually more radical than it might appear at first glance. Shany avoids
being too controversial by limiting his scope to jurisdiction.84 Furthermore,
although tribunals might not be directly contemplating the substance of
other self-contained regimes, they might reach the same outcomes by

79. Id. at 24–28.
80. Petersmann, supra note 30, at 365.
81. José E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38
TEX. INT’L L.J. 405, 417 (2003).
82. See Judge Gilbert Guillaume, Pres. of the ICJ, The Proliferation of International
Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the International Legal Order, Speech to the 6th
Comm. of the Gen. Assembly of the U.N. (Oct. 27, 2000), available at http://www.icjcij.org/presscom/index.php?p1=6&p2=1&pr=85&search=%22nagymaros%22.
83. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 81, at 418 (“The possibility of political backlash is
one reason that judges, and not merely international ones, are reluctant to admit that they
are engaging in judicial lawmaking even though this is precisely what they are doing.”).
84. See SHANY, supra note 11, at 269–70.
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simply sending cases away to competing regimes in a less regulated, discretionary atmosphere.
C. The View of the International Law Commission
The work of the ILC on the subject of fragmentation also lends some
insight to this discussion of comity as a solution to the perceived problems
with fragmentation. In the preliminary report on the matter, Martti
Koskenniemi states: “[t]here is no single legislative will behind international law. Treaties and custom come about as a result of conflicting motives
and objectives—they are ‘bargains’ and ‘package-deals’ and often result
from spontaneous reactions to events in the environment.”85 Nonetheless,
he concludes, “International law is a legal system . . . . There are meaningful relationships between [norms] . . . [and i]t is a generally accepted
principle that when several norms bear on a single issue they should, to
the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of
compatible obligations.”86
However, Koskenniemi argues elsewhere that any attempt to provide
for a coherent international law system is largely a struggle of competing
international law perspectives seeking to gain dominance over international law as a whole.87 In light of this, it must be emphasized that the
ILC’s use of the word “system” means only “that the various decisions,
rules and principles of which the law consists do not appear not randomly related to each other . . . [and that] there is seldom disagreement that it
is one of the tasks of legal reasoning to establish [relationships between
them].”88
Other authors also acknowledge this problem of competing legal perspectives, but simply argue for the particular values that their preferred
regime offers.89 The ILC itself recognizes this concern to some degree,
mainly by questioning whether coherence in the international legal system is necessary for its own sake. While the ILC sees value in predicta85. ILC, Apr. 13 Rep., supra note 12, ¶ 34.
86. ILC, July 18 Rep., supra note 12, ¶ 14.
87. Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 562 (2002).
88. ILC, Apr. 13 Rep., supra note 12, ¶ 33.
89. See Jan H. Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and Their Manifestations: The Operation of
the International Commercial and Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria, 24
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 129, 170–73 (2006) (arguing that it is important that “recognition
standards [themselves be] of a higher, more universal nature to be truly meaningful, and
not to reduce the recognition process merely to the will or sufferance of states,” but then
admitting that “[n]aturally, it is only to be expected that in the recognition process there
may be a preference for legal orders that recognize similar values, notions, and ideas as
those prevailing in the recognizing legal order”).
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bility, legal security, and equality, it does admit, “Coherence is . . . a
formal and abstract virtue. For a legal system that is regarded in some
respects as unjust or unworkable, no added value is brought by the fact of
its being coherently so.”90
One of the important insights in the ILC’s work is its interpretation of
conflict, which distinguishes between “conflicts within a regime” and
“conflicts across regimes.”91 The Vienna Convention sees conflicts as
subject-matter issues,92 but the ILC disagrees with this approach. For the
ILC, conflict cannot merely be a matter of classifying subject matter,
since no accepted classification scheme exists.93 The ILC favors Pauwelyn’s broad definition of conflict, which encompasses frustration of
purpose, over the narrow definition of two norms demanding incompatible results.94 In addition, the ILC supports Pauwelyn’s perspective that
“[w]hile the [DSU] limits the jurisdiction to claims which arise under the
WTO covered agreements only, there is no explicit provision identifying
the scope of applicable law.”95
Significantly, the ILC concludes that fragmentation is not a threat to
the international system, because whether conflicts reflect fragmentation
or diversity “lie[s] in the eye of the beholder.”96 Any complications that
ensue are not “legal-technical ‘mistakes,’” but rather, a natural consequence of the way the legal order works in a pluralistic system that
accommodates a variety of values.97 Admittedly, the ILC’s work only
discusses substantive conflicts, not the institutional conflicts that fragmentation also poses.98 As a result, the ILC looks to the Vienna Convention, other rules of general international law such as lex specialis, lex
posterior, and jus cogens, and the notion that international obligations
may develop to resolve conflicts.99 These techniques position various
legal values against one another using a language that all lawyers can
agree on and understand, thereby bringing legal closure to disputes. Perhaps such closure is what V.S. Mani contemplated when he wrote that
international adjudication “endeavors to resolve the dispute—or at least

90.
91.
92.
30).
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

ILC, Apr. 13 Rep., supra note 12, ¶ 491.
See id. app. § 2.
See id. ¶ 22 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 68, art.
See id. ¶ 22.
See id. ¶¶ 24–25 (citing PAUWELYN, CONFLICT, supra note 10).
Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 20.
See id. ¶ 16.
See id. ¶ 489.
See id. ¶ 18.

134

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 34:1

disposes it off from the juridical plane,”100 or what Sir Robert Jennings
meant when he distinguished between a dispute generally and the legal
or justiciable aspects of the dispute.101 Thus, whether we call the dynamics of the international legal system “fragmentation” or “diversity” does
not mean that lawyers cannot talk to each other and reach closure on the
legal aspects of a dispute.
The ILC’s work primarily focuses, like that of Pauwelyn, on existing
rules to resolve conflicts. However, where Pauwelyn might propose a
supposedly mechanical technique for definitively establishing superior
norms without regard for the morality of the norms (although conveniently human rights norms do triumph), the ILC finds that the nature of
the dispute resolution process in the international legal system is not so
apolitical102 and that the perspective of each regime must be to regard its
own norms as lex specialis.103 While Pauwelyn might argue that there
could be solutions to conflicts that a tribunal may discover, the ILC
might argue that a solution does not exist prior to the dispute, but, rather,
is formed through the process of assessing differing values and seeking
closure.104 In any event, neither party generally finds conflicts to be a
threat to a system of international law perceived as integrated.

100. V.S. MANI, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 1 (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 1980).
101. See Sir Robert Jennings, Reflections on the Term ‘Dispute,’ in ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF WANG TIEYA 401, 402–03 (Ronald St. John Macdonald, ed., 1994).
102. See ILC, Apr. 13 Rep., supra note 12, ¶ 35 (“Legal interpretation, and thus legal
reasoning, builds systemic relationships between rules and principles by envisaging them
as parts of some human effort or purpose. . . . [S]ystemic thinking penetrates all legal
reasoning . . . [and] may also be rationalized in terms of a political obligation on lawappliers to make their decisions cohere with the preferences and expectations of the
community whose law they administer.”). See also David Kennedy, The Nuclear Weapons Case, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 462, 466 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds.,
1999) (finding an apparent contradiction in “judges who flaunt their fealty to positive law
and an apolitical judiciary while remaining proud of their [political] engagement with the
humanist issues of the day, of their national or cultural patriotism, even their participation
in internationalist advocacy institutions of one or another stripe”).
103. See ILC, Apr. 13 Rep., ¶ 410 (“Whether a rule’s speciality or generality should be
decisive, or whether priority should be given to the earlier or to the later rule depended on
such aspects as the will of the parties, the nature of the instruments and their object and
purpose as well as what would be a reasonable way to apply them with minimal disturbance to the operation of the legal system.”).
104. See id. ¶ 20.
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II. COMPETITION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO COMITY
Competition is, of course, not the polar opposite of comity. Rather, it is
a trend that can pull in the opposite direction, but not necessarily so. We
might even consider competition as one kind of comity, that is, one kind
of relationship among legal actors. If the international legal system is
composed of independent legal actors, then fostering their independence
may support the system. With each of these actors operating independently and in competition with each other, the problems associated with
fragmentation can be effectively resolved.
Jan Dalhuisen has noted that
[i]n situations where the conflicting interests are such that there is
competition between the international commercial and financial order
and a state legal order, state courts in the countries most directly
concerned will be mindful of their state’s position, but even international arbitrators or state courts in other states may not be indifferent to
this competition, although the outcome may not be the same.105

John Dugard has observed that the ICJ was less frequently seized of
disputes after its decision in the early South West Africa case, which
emphasized more formalistic interpretive techniques, and then it successfully attracted disputants back to its facilities after shifting to a more
purposive analysis in the Namibia case.106
Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao has added:
Another stated reason for the formation of new tribunals is disenchantment with the decisions of the ICJ, but this explanation too is not a significant factor. After all, disenchantment with outcomes is not confined
to the ICJ or to judicial tribunals in general; it is a feature common to
most permanent institutional bodies.107

In addition, the ICJ apparently sought to accommodate the United
States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine case by constituting a special

105. Dalhuisen, supra note 89, at 170.
106. See generally John Dugard, Namibia (South West Africa): The Court’s Opinion,
South Africa’s Response, and Prospects for the Future, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14
(1972) (thoroughly discussing the Namibia case and its impact on the ICJ’s future).
107. Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection
of the Growing Strength of International Law or Its Fragmentation?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L.
929, 945 n.59 (2004) (“The disenchantment of developing countries with the court on
account of its decisions in the South-West Africa cases (1962, 1966) and the Northern
Cameroons case (1963) were mentioned for the establishment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.”).
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chamber of specific judges, due to the threat of the parties leaving the
court for an ad hoc tribunal.108
This reality of competition should not be overstated, since parties are
not entirely free to choose any judicial or quasi-judicial forum for dispute
resolution. However, this does not diminish the pressures of competition
on tribunals of all stripes, and not just pressure from other judicial
bodies. It has even been observed that an institution such as the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) “will need to compete, in highly charged
political environments, to fill its docket.”109 The apparent reluctance of
the U.N. Security Council, Secretary General, and Member States to enforce the arrest warrants issued for certain indicted Sudanese individuals
could suggest that the ICC is losing political influence as international
actors seek alternate methods to resolve the dispute within the Sudan.110
In selecting a dispute resolution forum, there may be structural limitations (i.e., treaty language), a lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or a lack of competence that limits the options for a particular
forum. Nonetheless, parties, as sovereign entities, may always seek to
resolve their differences through mediation, ad hoc arbitration, or one of
the many alternative methods, for example, simple negotiation.111 And,
States often prefer judicial tribunals to nonjudicial, including preferring
domestic processes to international.112 Accordingly, the existence of Al-

108. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 288 (7th rev. ed., Routledge 1997) (1970) (citing Case Concerning Delimititation of
the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246, 252
(Oct. 12)).
109. Alvarez, supra note 81, at 420–21 (“Political pressures may force that Court to
build bridges to, not supplant, the more ‘biased’ national venues for judging perpetrators
of mass atrocities that many ICC advocates disparage. . . . [T]he ICC . . . will continue to
depend . . . on the political will of states.”).
110. See The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, U.N.
Doc. S/2008/267 (Apr. 22, 2008); The Secretary General, Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the Sudan, U.N. Doc. S/2008/64 (Jan. 31, 2008). These two documents report
on the “overall situation in the country,” progress in implementing the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement in the Sudan, and “the plans for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration,” but fail to mention the outstanding arrest warrants for former interior minister
Ahmad Harun or Janjaweed militia commander Ali Kushayb issued by the ICC. Id. See
also Prosecutor v. Harun & Kushayb, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest
(Int’l. Crim. Ct., Apr. 27, 2007).
111. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, art. 33(1) (“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means
of their own choice.”).
112. See Alvarez, supra note 81, at 416–19.
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ternate Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) generally is enough to bring about
competition among tribunals.
In addition to negotiation and other ADR methods, the structure and
political nature of tribunals exerts competitive pressure. Observers have
noted that the WTO, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the
ICJ are subject to intense political pressures such as the selection of favorable judges, bringing political cases to tribunals, and compliance with
judgments113: “[p]olitics does not stop once a court is established and
adjudication begins.”114 Thus, the pressures of competition can arise not
only from direct conflicts of norms and jurisdiction, but also from the
constitutive nature of tribunals and even the personal career objectives of
the individual judges concerned. It must be recognized and accepted that
various tribunals do compete with each other for legal authority, and that
any effort to constitutionalize the international system, or otherwise establish norms for resolving conflicts, has a political result: the favoring
of certain tribunals.
A. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s View
Anne-Marie Slaughter agrees that there is competition among courts,
but her perspective is friendly. She denies a constitutional coherence to
the international legal order,115 and presents instead a system of “fellow
professionals in an endeavor that transcends national borders.”116 For
Slaughter, competition is constructive: “[j]udges who are beginning to
think of one another as participants in the same dispute resolution system
are often less willing to defer to one another out of the comity of nations.
. . . The result, paradoxically, is more dialogue and less deference.”117
However, she posits that through this sort of competition, “a distinct doctrine of ‘judicial comity’ will emerge: a set of principles designed to
guide courts in giving deference.”118 It is somewhat unclear if her version
of comity is discretionary or more rule-based, since she elsewhere argues
in favor of “constrained independence” where tribunals are limited only
by “structural, political, and discursive mechanisms,”119 which she poses
113. See id.
114. Id. at 415.
115. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191
(2003).
116. Id. at 193. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L
L. 1103 (2000).
117. Slaughter, supra note 115, at 194.
118. Id.
119. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International
Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 901 (2005).
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in opposition to the theory that “the only effective international tribunals
are ‘dependent’ [less ideological] tribunals.”120 Slaughter’s perspective
suggests that her vision of comity is quite different from Pauwelyn’s.
Slaughter presumes that through friendly competition, some kind of
international law of comity (or similar constitutionalizing solution to
address conflicts) will emerge. Slaughter’s theory assumes that conflicts
are destructive and that, at some point, international law may be able to
rid itself of conflicts. The reality is that conflicts are more likely to be a
permanent fixture, but may serve a constructive purpose in themselves.
B. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth’s View
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth extensively discuss tribunal competition in connection with ADR’s propensity to attract business121 and the
diffusion of law into new jurisdictions.122 They are particularly interested
in how certain laws compete with others to govern legal outcomes,123 and
the spread of American norms, which have competed with and pushed
aside European norms.124 In fact, the competition they see goes so far as
to offer competing definitions of arbitration/mediation.125 Dezalay and
Garth have also noted that the competitive atmosphere in international
law has intensified, transporting considerations of the market into the
law,126 and that in terms of maintaining legitimacy and social relevance,
this might be a healthy updating of the law and legal dispute resolution.127
Dezalay and Garth’s observations seem accurate. Like Slaughter, they
acknowledge the reality of competition and acknowledge that it has nor120. Id. (citing Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International
Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8, 27 (2005)).
121. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Fussing About the Forum: Categories and
Definitions as Stakes in a Professional Competition, 21 L. & SOC. INQ. 285, 287 (1996).
122. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE
WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN
STATES (2002).
123. See id.
124. Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs:
Constructing International Justice out of the Competition for Transnational Business
Disputes, in YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
33, 39 (1996) (“As is the case for the entire field of business law, the Anglo-American
model of the business enterprise and merchant competition is tending to substitute itself
for the Continental model of legal artisans and corporatist control over the profession.”).
125. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 121, at 292.
126. Id. See also Mauricio García-Villegas, Comparative Sociology of the Law, 31 L.
& SOC. INQUIRY 343 (2006).
127. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 121, at 308–10.
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mative effects. Also like Slaughter, their observations are stated as fact
(though not without a hint of sadness for the passing of the old order) and
are emblematic of the new normative system supplanting the old. ADR
has been, as a field, historically dominated by Europeans, and it is now
becoming increasingly dominated by Americans. As such, Americans
will bring their own norms with them, pushing out the older, European
ones. Competition continuously produces newer, and possibly more relevant and fair, norms.
III. THE DRAWBACKS AND BENEFITS OF COMPETITION
A. Drawbacks of Competition
Competition among tribunals has led some to criticize tribunals or individual judges for making themselves attractive as decision makers,128
and highlight the drawbacks posed to the international legal system. Forum shopping is almost always identified as one of the more serious
threats, criticized for providing parties opportunities to select a tribunal
based on “access to the court, the procedure followed, the court’s
composition, . . . its power to make certain types of order[,] . . . [or] the
case-law . . . [that] happens to be more favourable to certain doctrines,
concepts[,] or interests.”129 More specifically, “[t]he particular procedures involved may . . . influence the application of substantive domestic
or foreign law and the outcome of disputes.”130 Also cited as drawbacks
are parallel litigation (often linked to litigation costs),131 the development
of a more litigious international environment,132 and a “risk of conflicting
judgments,”133 especially by courts with differing expertise and competence.134 Even more grave, the fragmentation of the law could accelerate

128. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 124; Guillaume, supra note 82.
129. Guillaume, supra note 82, ¶ 13.
130. Petersmann, supra note 30, at 282.
131. Id. at 358 (“As the very broad scope of WTO law overlaps with numerous other
international and regional agreements, cooperation among international and national
courts becomes ever more important for maintaining the rule of law and reducing transaction costs, particularly in international relations among producers, investors, traders, and
consumers.”).
132. See SHANY, supra note 11, at 77–78.
133. Guillaume, supra note 82, ¶ 15 (“Systems of national law have for long had to
deal with [the problems associated with contradictory decisions]. They have solved them
by two methods: on the one hand, the development of a clear hierarchy among courts, on
the other, the formulation of rules on litispendency and res judicata.”).
134. Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 23.
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and increase destabilizing forces, threatening the international rule of
law135 and thereby endangering legal certainty itself.136
B. Benefits of Competition
These criticisms, leaning on a theory of a coherent international legal
system, presuppose that competition has only drawbacks: they do not
give due regard to potential benefits. What is problematic about a party
forum shopping, especially a sovereign State that has constructed the
very tribunal it now wishes to seize, even if it affects the kind of justice
reached? As Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann observes, “Forum shopping and
multiple litigations have become frequent in the legally and institutionally fragmented international law of human rights.”137 Petersmann continues by noting that
[w]hereas forum shopping in private international commercial law may
seriously inconvenience private parties attacked against their will in
distant fora applying foreign law, respondent parties in intergovernmental litigation usually have the resources to defend themselves in
international courts whose jurisdiction they have voluntarily accepted.138

In fact, we might argue that forum shopping is, in essence, what States
have always done when they have created new arbitral tribunals or
claims commissions for disputes. Not content with the decisions or perhaps even the kind of justice they might receive at one tribunal, States
create others, ones they perceive to be more fair, often referring to them
as possessing “better expertise” or as being “more specialized.”139 It cannot be forgotten that in international law, as opposed to domestic legal
systems, a tribunal only has jurisdiction by state consent.140 If forum
shopping is considered a problem, then the solution would be to prohibit
135. Id. ¶ 27.
136. See ILC, Apr. 13 Rep., supra note 12, ¶ 52.
137. Petersmann, supra note 30, at 283.
138. Id. at 360.
139. See, e.g., Hafner, supra note 1, at 861; Firew Kebede Tiba, What Caused the Multiplicity of International Courts and Tribunals?, 10 GONZ. J. INT’L. L. 202 (2006). See
also Press Release, Secretary-General Hopes More and More Parties Will Make Use of
International Tribunal for Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7477/ SEA/1684 (July 3,
2000).
140. See CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JURISDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
69 (2003) (“If agreement or consent is permitted to be the basis of jurisdiction of a [domestic] tribunal, such as an arbitral tribunal, related to the legal system, it is because it is
expressly and exceptionally permitted to be so by the law of the land. In any case such a
tribunal is ultimately controlled in one way or another by a national tribunal whose jurisdiction is not based on consent of the parties to the dispute but on the legitimate law of
the land.”).
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States from creating any new tribunals, perhaps even ones on a bilateral
or regional basis. This is not only a conceptually difficult task, but also
practically impossible to accomplish.
As for multiple litigations, Pauwelyn interestingly comments:
[The burden of] adjudicating the same dispute before two different tribunals does not necessarily amount to wasteful duplication. In case
each of the two tribunals deals with clearly distinct matters—such as a
WTO or [South African Development Community] panel dealing with
trade-related claims and [International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea]
with matters related to the law of the sea or conservation—multiple
proceedings may actually be helpful as long as each tribunal stays within the limits of its jurisdiction and defers to the other tribunal when it
comes to deciding matters falling within that tribunal’s jurisdiction.141

Accordingly, even if the pressures on a party to defend multiple suits
were a valid concern, others have observed that it is already acceptable
for persons to be subjected to parallel or conflicting laws as an inherent
aspect of globalization.142
Competition among tribunals might lead to better decisions. A court
may not be required to follow another’s jurisprudence, but the risk of
another forum reaching a contrary result and potentially embarrassing the
tribunal might encourage a more careful weighing of issues. A tribunal
may not be seized of a similar dispute again, and thus may not have the
opportunity to refine its jurisprudence on a given issue; judges might also
lose opportunities for career-advancing positions if their decisions come
into disrepute. In addition, a State faced with truly conflicting decisions
from two or more tribunals, that is, decisions requiring an act that
breaches another obligation, must make a choice and violate one regime
in order to follow the other. It is doubtful that any tribunal would want to
be seen as imposing less important decisions that are less likely to be
followed, and therefore, a tribunal may tailor its judgments to avoid forcing a State to make such a decision.
In the recent Kadi and Yusuf cases before the Court of First Instance of
the European Communities (“Court of First Instance”), although no jus
cogens concerns were held to be at issue, the court suggested that some
form of conflict with the decisions of the U.N. Security Council might be
possible over jus cogens issues, and that it could not defer to the Security
Council in such a case.143 Since the issues did not rise to the level of jus
141. Pauwelyn, Going Global, supra note 10, at 295.
142. See Nicolaïdis & Tong, supra note 70.
143. Case T-315/01, Kadi v. E.U. Council, 2005 E.C.R.. II-3649; Case T-306/01, Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. E.U. Council, 2005 E.C.R. I-17.
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cogens, one might wonder why the Court of First Instance bothered to
devote analysis to a potential conflict with the Security Council, and
whether it was merely the court’s political assertion of the primacy of
human rights norms. While on appeal to the ECJ, the Advocate General
suggested that the ECJ could not defer to the Security Council’s command—a command that would demand a violation of human rights
law—and the ECJ subsequently agreed with that opinion.144 Human
rights campaigners might applaud the ECJ for remaining within its competence and not giving decisive weight to Security Council decisions, but
they might also decry the WTO for failing to step outside its competence
to consider human rights obligations. Forcing a State to choose between
honoring its obligations to the European Communities or to the Security
Council may lead both the ECJ and the Security Council to reach more
considered judgments in the future.
The improvement of tribunals through competition need not be so
confrontational. For example, some observers have noted that a kind of
comity through competition, perhaps just what Slaughter hopes for, has
developed between the ECJ and European Court of Human Rights
(“ECHR”), which “has markedly increased the quality of Luxembourg’s
jurisprudence, in that the latter cites and examines Strasbourg case-law
explicitly, rather than making elliptical assertions of fundamental rights
compliance.”145 Furthermore, the methods of analysis used by one
tribunal might embolden another to improve its approach, particularly if
those two tribunals compete with one another. It has been observed that
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body applies more aggressive and “stricter
standards of judicial review compared to the more deferential ‘margin of
appreciation’ doctrine applied by human rights courts [and that

144. For the Advocate General’s opinions, see Case C-402/05 P, Kadi v. E.U. Council,
et al., 2008 E.C.R. I-39; Case C-415/05 P, Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council of the
E.U., et al., 2008 E.C.R. I-11. Shortly before publication of this Article, the ECJ issued
its opinion in the joined cases and indeed agreed with the Advocate General’s opinion
that the municipal effects of the Security Council’s resolution must comply with EU human rights standards. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l
Found. v. Council of the E.U., et al., ¶¶ 285–330 (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://eurlex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0402:EN:HTML. The ECJ’s
reference to the case law of the ECHR should be noted. Id.
145. Cathryn Costello, The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights,
6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 87, 129 (2006). It is to be noted that the ECJ sits in Luxembourg and
the ECHR sits in Strasbourg. The Court of Justice of the European Communities,
http://curia.europa.edu/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2008); European Court of Human Rights,
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
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c]ompeting jurisdictions among courts . . . may contribute to improving
the quality and overall consistency of judicial reasoning.”146
Indeed, Upendra Baxi has written about the failure of arbitration panels
to consider human rights issues in reaching decisions,147 but this criticism
could be an argument in favor of more competition among tribunals. The
argument would proceed as follows: if a matter were settled by an arbitration panel that ignored human rights issues, that settlement should not
preclude another competing court from pronouncing a judgment on the
human rights aspects of the same matter. This lack of preclusion might
discourage parties from excluding human rights matters from the arbitration panel’s competence, since those matters might be dealt with by
another court in the future anyway. Thus, the decision itself would consider the entirety of the legal issues at stake and might present a better
chance of compliance.
Competition might also make for better courts in and of themselves.
Increased comity, as a solution, may sacrifice the benefits of selfcontained regimes to realize a kind of unobtainable desired coherence in
international law. However, courts do a better job of improvement when
they themselves are the agents of change. Many have noted that “most
international judicial bodies operate in ‘splendid isolation,’ . . . with
little, if any, regard for the jurisprudence of other international tribunals.”148 Judge Guillaume has observed, though, that “[e]very judicial
body tends—whether or not consciously—to assess its value by reference to the frequency with which it is seised.”149 David Kennedy has also
remarked that “the Court is one cultural and political institution among
others, crafting its decision to enhance its legitimacy and pull towards
compliance.”150 Accordingly, losing work to competing tribunals might
suggest to a tribunal that it should improve. Although strictly writing
about international commercial arbitration, Yves Dezalay and Bryant
Garth’s observation has relevance here:
Competition among key actors and groups . . . serves to construct legal
legitimacy[;] . . . the competitive battles that take place within it are
146. Petersmann, supra note 30, at 366 (citing MATTHIAS OESCH, STANDARDS OF
REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2003) (exploring the alternate standards of review
in WTO dispute resolutions)).
147. See Baxi, supra note 18, at 198–99.
148. Petersmann, supra note 30, at 283.
149. See Guillaume, supra note 82, ¶ 14.
150. Kennedy, supra note 102, at 464. See also id. at 466 (“And the sophisticated
commentators were quick to see the wisdom of the Court’s manoeuvre—for the Court
also manoeuvres, worries about its legitimacy, its allies and enemies in the game of mutual political regard.”).
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fought in symbolic terms among moral entrepreneurs. Battles fought
. . . build careers and markets for those who are successful in this competition, and they build the legitimacy and credibility of international
legal practices and international institutions.151

In support of this observation, Dezalay and Garth cite as an example
the waning of the dispute market presence that the International Chamber
of Commerce once offered to new arbitral institutions seeking to attract
disputants as clients.152 It has also been mentioned that the continuing
Doha reassessment by the Member States—that is, their reassessment of
the effectiveness of the WTO DSU—is likely to strengthen the tribunal.153
Turning to the diversity of tribunals, this diversity permits parties to
select the tribunal most likely to produce a certain outcome because of
the application of certain norms. This diversity is also beneficial in that it
permits parties to select a tribunal more insulated from undesirable politics or corruption.154 Accordingly, the fairness of tribunals is oft-cited as
a reason that some States prefer ADR.155
In a similar manner, another benefit of competition might be increased
transparency.156 Competition provides an incentive to produce decisions
that will be followed,157 and thus, gives courts an incentive to be perceived as fair. It is frequently noted that the ICJ decision in Nicaragua
may have been mostly to blame for the U.S. backlash against the court.158

151. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 124, at 33.
152. Id. at 44 (“This rapid expansion of the market of arbitration naturally awakened
new appetites. The ICC thus found itself more and more in competition with new arbitral
institutions aiming at such or such segment of this very diverse market.”).
153. See Petersmann, supra note 30.
154. See id. at 359 (“The rule-oriented WTO dispute settlement system clearly
mitigates power disparities in international relations and helps governments limit power
politics inside their countries[, for example], by limiting protectionist abuses of trade
policy discretion in favor of rent-seeking interest groups by requiring independent
judicial remedies inside countries like China that did not have such legal institutions prior
to WTO membership.”) (internal parentheses omitted).
155. See Betty Southard Murphy, ADR’s Impact on International Commerce, 48 DISP.
RESOL. J. 68 (1993).
156. Dezalay & Garth, supra note at 124, at 49 (“[I]t is partly a matter of introducing
competition in a market that was strongly cartelized. . . . But it is even more essential and
also more difficult to introduce a minimum of transparency in a community of specialists
characterized by personal relations so complex and so entangled that the interdict access
to this market by nonspecialists.”).
157. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 523, 524 (2005).
158. See Alvarez, supra note 81, at 417–18.

2008]

COMPETITION AND COMITY

145

Since state compliance is still dependent on state cooperation,159 States
may be more inclined to comply with judgments that are reached by
courts perceived as fair. Similarly, in the context of arbitration, Christopher Drahozal has argued that “[c]ompetition to be selected by parties
gives arbitrators a stronger incentive than public court judges to enforce
the provisions of the parties’ contract, including the parties’ contractual
choice of law.”160 Drahozal suggests that such reasoning might also be
applicable to courts.161 Accordingly, competition, transparency, and the
need for decisions that spur compliance with the law might motivate
tribunals to develop in a fair and noncorrupt way. International constitutionalization and the comity proposals of Pauwelyn and Shany may not
offer this benefit.
In fact, attempting to constitutionalize international courts might ignite
an even more combative fragmentation among tribunals. For example,
Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Joyce Tong argue that the Westphalian project
was essentially one aimed at destroying hierarchies and establishing
horizontal equality.162 Indeed, managing legal tensions with conflict rules
that require comity might place certain tribunals or their norms in a more
vertical position; this postion might actually increase intertribunal hostility,163 and any friendliness that Slaughter sees among horizontal tribunals
might be lost. States exercising their sovereign prerogatives might gravitate to more ad hoc, bilateral tribunals that apply alternative equitable
solutions rather than solutions drawn from the strict corpus of international law, all of which will generate even more conflicting international
norms. Failure to embrace decentralized norm building might exacerbate
the fragmentation of international law, which frustrates advocates of a
constitutionalized, international legal system.
In addition to better tribunals and better decisions, increased competition could make for better justice. For example, if a particular tribunal
becomes more popular, is this not an endorsement by the parties that they
regard the court as achieving justice? Judge Guillaume finds the increased competition among courts as a risk that “[could lead c]ertain
courts . . . to tailor their decisions so as to encourage a growth in their
caseload, to the detriment of a more objective approach to justice. Such a
159. See id.
160. Drahozal, supra note 157, at 524; Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms,
Commercial Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 79, 106–07 (2000).
161. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process,
51 SMU L. REV. 469 (1998).
162. Nicolaïdis & Tong, supra note 70, at 1371–72.
163. See id.
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development would be profoundly damaging to international justice.”164
Bruno Simma has also noted that “the exclusion or modification through
a ‘self-contained regime’ of ‘normal’ secondary rules [could lead] to a
‘softening’ of the legal consequences of wrongful acts.”165 But if competition may produce more carefully crafted decisions—decisions largely
perceived as fair and more accurately reflective of the law made by
States for States—then is this development not in pursuit of justice?
CONCLUSION
In short, the fears of fragmentation may be overstated. First, there are
forces opposing fragmentation such as interjudicial dialogue, common
legal traditions, and harmonization, as well the application of many of
the same rules of general international law.166 Second, any threat to legal
certainty posed by fragmentation does not appear particularly graver in
the modern era than any preceding time period. These kinds of conflicts
are simply part of the nature of the international legal system.167 That
being said, competition may, in fact, produce better norms. Drahozal has
stated that “[t]he more choices of national law available to parties, the
more likely they can find a national law that they prefer. Indeed, . . . contractual choice of law facilitates interjurisdictional competition, thereby
further enhancing the choices available to the parties.”168 Fragmenting
norms could provide opportunities for better norms, particularly since
differing legal traditions bring differing norms to adjudication, all of
which may have their relative strengths.169 In support of this, Nicolaïdis
and Tong cite to the competition between the United States and EU
countries to export their legal models, as well as the diversity in the legal
164. Guillaume, supra note 82, ¶ 14.
165. Simma, supra note 53, at 135.
166. See Burke-White, supra note 37, at 964, 974, 978. See also William W. BurkeWhite, Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 755–61 (2003).
167. ILC, Apr. 13 Rep., supra note 12, ¶ 492 (“One principal conclusion of this report
has been that the emergence of special treaty-regimes (which should not be called ‘selfcontained’) has not seriously undermined legal security, predictability or the equality of
legal subjects.”)
168. Drahozal, supra note 157, at 548–49.
169. See Trevor C. Hartley, The European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of
the Common Law of Conflict of Laws, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 813, 814 (2005); Michaels,
supra note 25, at 1008 (“American law relies on broad standards of ‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness’ that are applied in each individual case. This enables the judge to focus on
achieving justice in individual cases even if it hampers predictability for the parties. European law, by contrast, uses hard and fast rules that are easier to apply and therefore
more predictable but may lead to unjust results in individual cases.”).
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models in Europe, which instills a normative power in these models.170
This continual updating of law and legal dispute resolution is healthy for
the law to maintain legitimacy while keeping up with social change.171
How popular courts weigh the need for equality, the right to a hearing,
and so on might suggest a balance among principles that is the most just
approach. Other tribunals may look to the decisions of more popular fora
as examples of justice, and reform themselves and their image appropriately.
Changes in the substance of the law brought about by conflicts of
norms and jurisdiction can be beneficial. Some academics have written
about the evolution of certain rules due to competition for business, such
as the role of party autonomy.172 Others have discussed the criticism
made in regards to tribunals’ applications of comity rules designed to
resolve conflicts.173 In addition, according to Petersmann, “The ruleoriented WTO dispute settlement system [has been cited as mitigating]
power disparities in international relations.”174
Thus, increased competition may increase the diversity of legal norms
and the legitimacy of the norms applied. As William Burke-White has
articulated, the interaction of fragmenting and antifragmenting trends
produces a pluralist legal order, which is more open to a variety of alternative norms.175 The attractiveness of this theory is that there is an international legal system that is legitimate and effective because it strikes a
balance between diversity and universality.176 This diversity of legal
norms “can be a source of normative power.”177 As the ILC has
observed, “Even as international law’s diversification may threaten its
coherence, it does this by increasing its responsiveness to the regulatory
context.”178
Any objection to the beneficial role of fragmentation is based on one’s
conception of justice and whether justice can be a democratic and com-

170. Nicolaïdis & Tong, supra note 70, at 1374–75.
171. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 121, at 310.
172. See Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the
United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233 (2006).
173. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 567.
174. See Petersmann, supra note 30, at 359.
175. Burke-White, supra note 37, at 978.
176. See id.
177. Nicolaïdis & Tong, supra note 70, at 1374 (noting the success of the EU political
and legal model around the world, based partly on its underlying diversity in contrast to
the American model, which is largely homogenous).
178. ILC, Apr. 13, Rep., supra note 12, ¶ 492.
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petitive preference. If the South West Africa cases179 at first lost work for,
and then later brought work back to, the ICJ, then the latter decisions in
this series can be regarded in one of two ways: merely a play
for prestige, or a constructive acknowledgement that the international
community thought that its prior decisions were wrong and did not do
justice. With the deliberate adoption of the more purposive interpretation
method described by Dugard,180 the ICJ may be seen as reforming itself
in order to better execute justice, notwithstanding the critical remarks of
South Africa’s ad hoc judge in the final South West Africa case regarding
the justice achieved.181 Prior ICJ decisions had led some developing
countries to view the court as a failure, and prefer the establishment of
new dispute settlement tribunals, such as the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea.182 Perhaps the recent increase in business for the ICJ
shows that countries now regard the court as just, striking a balance
between, on the one hand, the interests of States in retaining the role of
sovereign consent in international law and, on the other hand, the international community’s need to constrain States’ freedom of action.
Of course, the opposite can be easily argued: justice is not popular.
However, if international tribunals are created by States in order to do
justice among them, then being recognized as the “most attractive” forum is evidence that a particular tribunal may have a better appreciation
for justice. Petersmann has argued that “national and international courts
do not yet constitute a coherent legal and judicial system,”183 the word
“coherent” being used in the sense of a single, legitimate, normproducing system without internal inconsistencies. However, is this not a
form of coherence if a system allows the best court, norm, or justice to
survive? Fragmentation may not be a problem to be solved, but rather, a
sign that the international legal system needs to consider a variety of legal norms.184 As society’s definition of justice evolves, so do many
tribunals, not necessarily towards a top-down, constitutionalized, hierarchical system overseeing a coherent, unitary international legal order, or
179. See South West Africa Cases (Ethiop. v. S. Afr. & Liberia v. S. Afr.), 2d Phase,
1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (July 18), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/46/4931.pdf;
South West Africa Cases (Ethiop. v. S. Afr & Liberia v. S. Afr.), Prelim. Objs., 1962
I.C.J. Rep. 319 (Dec. 21), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/46/4887.pdf.
180. See Dugard, supra note 106, at 33–38.
181. See South West Africa Cases (2d Phase), 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 68 (separate opinion of
Judge Van Wyk, ad hoc), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/46/4939.pdf.
182. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 107, at 945 n.59.
183. Petersmann, supra note 30, at 360.
184. See ILC, Apr. 13, Rep., supra note 12, ¶ 487 (“Even as the law may not go much
further than require a willingness to listen to others, take [others’] points of view into
account and . . . find a reasoned resolution at the end.”).
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for that matter towards a network of friendly, lending, and borrowing
professionals. Instead, they may affirm a bottom-up, vigorous system
where different legal actors compete for the best realization of justice.

